VDP-111: VITA-FAST Governance and Constitution

Benji, as you know - I am not talking about politics here or control. We have discussed this at length async. And of course, our EIRs/Project Leads also could not care less. I am talking about the fact that by forcing an “election” of the person coordinating the project, who in most cases is paid by VitaDAO and not the project budget pre IP-NFT fractionalization btw, your are subverting every single process we put together so far as voted for by the tokenholders in SG 3c. Why vote for it at all if you essentially kill it within a couple of months?

For the voters and readers here who do not know, here is how the current spinoff (i.e. projects like Korolchuk) process within VitaDAO looks like:

  1. The project is sourced, vetted, reviewed and funded through a governance proposal
  2. The project is added to the Builder (Commercialization) Squad pipeline, if fulfilling certain criteria
  3. A Project Lead is assigned from the pool of EIRs. EIRs are vetted individuals, often serial entrepreneurs who have demonstrated the required experience and skills (e.g. brought companies to IPOs, drugs to market, achieved exits to Pharma, etc.) to bring the project to the next value inflection point.
  4. The Lead, with the help of the Squad, builds a detailed project plan in our Asana environment, complete with tasks, deadlines, milestones, etc.
  5. The Lead liaises with the scientists (e.g. like Dr. Korolchuk), plans, strategizes, build a long term relationship - and acts as a quasi CEO
  6. The Lead reports regularly to the Squad, the Stewards, and finally the Community
  7. The Lead disburses funds as planned through the “use of proceeds” section in the governance for the project that was approved
  8. Any deviations from the above are approved from the Stewards

What you are suggesting is that after putting in a LOT of effort and time to onboard the Lead, and this same person putting in effort to lead the project implementation for potentially months, we put up this position for an election. What percentage - among the small pool of competent EIRs - do you envision would agree to commit to all of that that just to potentially be voted out for a non-meritocracy related reason?

If we are electing the Lead, why have the Builder Squad at all? The Squad appoints Leads and manages the projects pre-IP-NFT and should continue to do so post fractionalization. Frax does not change what needs to be done and how. In addition, how do you envision VITA-FAST tokenholders will decide on the 10k transactions? The treasury from the frax is now ~40k, correct? So tokeholders decide on that, but do not decide on the rest of the budget, i.e. 220k? Does this not look unfair and a bit like a facade to you?

Tyler has already suggested the potential for a completely rational solution, which is essentially for token holders to ratify (or not, of course) the existing lead, rather than elect one.

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