A lot of the discussion above relates to a dispute resolution process which deserves its own space outside of this proposal. I’ve provided that space in section e) of VDP-37, phrased it to reflect the discussion above, and would encourage to continue the discussion there. See also this comment.
That’s an interesting take, would need to think more about that. From my experience, most DAOs do in fact have quite uniform on-chain votes, although this is because the controversy took place in previous instances on calls, on Discord, on Discourse and elsewhere. Most DAOs also tend to have rather uncontroversial proposals, with a new notable exceptions such as the Brantly/ENS case. IMO, the reason most DAOs vote in consensus isn’t that they work hard on achieving consensus all the time, but because most proposals aren’t controversial at all but rather technicalities.
Generally and also in the case of VitaDAO, I believe that we won’t get very far if we always require consensus for decisions. That’s also how our governance has been set up from the beginning as both phase 2 and phase 3 votes require a majority vote.
In my understanding, the VDP-34 says that VitaCore does only consist of members who are there in their role in some other group (groups 1-4), meaning that anyone onboarded to or offboarded from that other groups will automatically join or leave VitaCore.
VitaCore does not have any individual members, but individuals who are part of a certain stakeholder group.
Should we make that more explicit?
We’re in agreement that nobody requires consensus. We attempt to build it and appeal to majority rule (in which up to 49% are unhappy) only if that fails. We do that already. By the time something makes it to a majority vote we’re usually aligned. Otherwise you’d see a lot of variations with some people’s preference in phase 2 and 3, right?
Fully agree. Consensus shouldn’t be required to account for edge cases, but we should always do our best to consider all opposing arguments and aim for consensus!
Did we cover everyone’s concerns and are there any more substantial edits to be made to the proposal?
The last significant change was made two days ago, so unless there will be another one the proposal may move to phase 3 in five days.
This conversation has gotten quite involved. The main points at issue are:
- Who can nominate a steward
- Dispute Resolution (covered by another proposal, but discussed heavily here)
- How do challenges work
- Majority Rule vs Consensus Building
First, and this is key, this proposal is contingent on the dispute resolution being in place and understood, so I would suggest this vote not occur until the dispute resolution is finalized, since the content of this proposal wouldn’t make sense without the dispute resolution in place.
Who Can Nominate a Steward
The subjective criteria of “significant overlap” is undefined and unsuitable as a criteria for a stewardship nomination. I suggest we make this more concrete so we don’t end up with another path for significant disagreement. This is the way I would suggest we word it: “Any single steward, or any three working group members can nominate anyone as a new steward who fulfils and agrees to the requirements listed below.” We need to keep this criteria simple and not itself subject to dispute.
Covered already and further comment in the Governance Amendment. The key item to address here is the challenge mechanic IS an appeal to dispute resolution, and so the VitaCore member who challenges a steward is considered the creator of the dispute and should bear the cost of that dispute resolution - but in this case, as it is a privilege of VitaCore to challenge the nomination of a steward, the cost of the challenge stays with the challenger (cannot be transferred to the person nominated).
How Do Challenges Work
This is a particularly important part of the proposal, with passing attention in the discussions. This is a privilege VitaCore has, and as such it should be handled with care. Challenges should be considered high damage by the people in VitaCore, and should cost a stake of 5% of the challenger’s VITA (as known from distributions and sales registered with the DAO - not self reported). If the dispute resolution resolves amicably and without judgement by arbitration, the stake is returned. If the challenge ends up arbitrated, then the arbitrator(s) decide the disposition of that stake based on the facts in the case - and this can result in forfeit if the challenge was found to be improper. Challenges must not be free to VitaCore members as challenges represent a significant governance privilege. The challenge must be in writing, costly, and at a minimum reported immediately to both the challenged nominee and to the DAO. The written challenge must be provided to the nominee, and must include the reason for the challenge. The dispute resolution should remain private by default, unless challenged party desires the challenge to become public. With both the cost and potentially public nature of a challenge, we can be sure the challenges we receive are worth the cost to the DAO.
Majority Rule vs Consensus Building
In this I agree with @theobtl and @longevion - we should always strive for consensus building. A lack of consensus should not result in some arbitrary need to accomplish super majorities though. While there is a risk of the minority being overrun, with consensus building prior to votes, this should be much less of a risk. Also, the proposed governance doesn’t include a VitaCore vote at all until after the working group members get to vote. What this means is that any situation where VitaCore votes against the working group members will be high damage. I propose that we order this a little differently:
- Any three working group members or any steward nominates
- VitaCore gets a week to Challenge
- If challenged, challenge announced and dispute resolution starts
- If no challenge happened or the dispute resolution resolves with nominee still in place, submit to working group member vote
- VitaCore confirms vote, but to disagree with working group member result requires a majority of VitaCore to agree with going against the DAO’s vote
- If the votes were successful, and steward accepts, then the steward onboards.
Fully agree. I’d suggest that we change it to your wording.
I agree that challenges should be not be taken lightly. I would support requiring a 5% stake of one’s VITA, as you suggest, though that should probably be discussed in a larger group so that this doesn’t come at a surprise to those who only pay attention once this proposal is live on Snapshot. We should bring it up in tomorrow’s cross-working group call.
Also curious to hear from legal (@Jesse?) whether you can think of any legal ramifications that requiring such a stake had?
That’s right. We originally changed the order based on an earlier discussion in Discord (cc @alphazwest, @FanONegative) to give more of a say to working groups. The high damage you are describing could also be seen as a feature rather than a bug, as it would require a very good reason to be credible. That would be a reason to keep the order as is.
On the other hand, I believe we have a different context now. With a significantly improved Code of Conduct, a new Dispute Resolution process underway and all that being tied to this Stewardship proposal, the options for VitaCore to challenge are much more limited. This was not yet clear at the time of the time we discussed this order in Discord a while ago.
Given that a) the options for VitaCore to challenge are now heavily regulated by the Code of Conduct and b) any legitimate challenge that would occur after the working group had already voted on a nomination does indeed cause high damage, I would second @audieleon’s suggestion to change the order as he described.
I think one point of concern here would be the case of a would-be Steward seeking to recruit friends or etc. as working group members—with the sole purpose of having them put forth a nomination for the would-be Steward. A formalization of the transition process from Working Group Guest → Working Group Contributor might help ensure a reasonable amount of legitimate contribution (read as “commitment to the community”) has been given as consideration before one has the ability to assist in a nomination. Essentially, a safeguard against a would-be Steward from casually bestowing the role of Contributor to possible new recruits having joined solely to put forth the nomination.
Given the support here and as discussed during our off-site last week, I’ve updated the proposal accordingly and swapped steps 2 (working group vote) and 3 (VitaCore challenge).
I have also included @audieleon’s rephrasing of Any three working group members or any steward for nominating a new steward for now, but would appreciate further opinions on that.
That is probably a legitimate concern. However, I wonder: Does it matter if we assume that the following steps of the process would prevent any of such malicious activities? If neither VitaCore challenges the motivation nor the working group members vote against the nomination, wouldn’t the nomination probably be rightful and reasonable then?
I’d say so. If we can agree on that, I’d much rather stick to a simple definition and one that is not itself subject to dispute, like Audie has argued.
I think you are spot-on in assuming that other checkpoints would effectively supersede any issues this would cause. I think simple is definitely better.
I’ve asked Token Engineering Commons for feedback on this since the original process was inspired from theirs.
we don’t open this process for the whole community. We’ve had arguments for both, but the rationale to have this closed to the stewards group is that they have the most insight in the community and also on the role of steward to bring a new person in. Also it doesn’t open for bigger conflicts. It’s sensitive to have an open nomination where the community could vote someone down and affect this person sense of belonging.
also, we have community stewards that aren’t stewards of a working group - they are just stewarding the community in their particular way that is also valuable. We also have working group leads that are not community stewards. Separating this two roles was important for our organization and understanding of responsibilities
See more here: Community Stewards Working Group Manifesto - Google Docs
I think it makes sense to discuss pros and cons around taking things “public” by default, instead of just allowing anyone to make a public proposal, like “appeal to a higher court if you disagree with the private group’s decision”.
But I think it’s definitely an improvement if there’s a dispute resolution process when there’s disagreement. With appropriate escalation as needed.
Trying to summarize the various stewardship appointment mechanics proposed in the comments above, I notice it’d be useful to have a resolution on what the dispute resolution process is VDP-37 VitaDAO Governance Amendment #2
Thanks for reaching out again to TEC! Livia argues that the stewards group has the most insight in the community which is why they keep nominations to that circle. We’ve discussed the same initially but my impression was that we found that our working group members are usually sufficiently vetted and involved to be qualified to make nominations, especially if we require three working group members for one nomination. Also, VitaCore can still object (step 2) and vote against (step 3).
Rather than changing step 1 from “Any three working group members or any steward” back to just “Any steward”, we could also define steps 1-3 as being private to VitaCore, while steps 4-5 would be public. Meaning, three any working group members could nominate a new steward privately to VitaCore. If a majority of VitaCore supports the nomination (step 3), the nomination would be made public in #cross-wg-chat. Would that be an appropriate compromise?
The latest (and significantly revised) Dispute Resolution Process proposal will be published here in the next hours. Is there anything else that requires this Stewardship Process proposal to be updated?
Agree on keeping steps 1-3 private.
I think we should aim for consensus instead of majority rule. If VitaCore members have big reservations about a nominee, they can trigger a dispute resolution process (which seems worthwhile, to keep harmony in the group).
I’m updating the proposal to include that. If that is the last change, we can move forward to the Snapshot vote in seven days.
Edit: Of course this proposal is dependent on the Dispute Resolution Process (DRP) so we will move both proposals to Snapshot at the same time. The DRP has been substantially revised and will also be up for discussion on Discourse for at least seven more days once its up.
This is certainly a valid perspective. We’ve discussed this a few times already and it seems controversial, so I’m not including it in the proposal right away but would put it up for discussion again. @Savva argued for a majority vote, I do too, @audieleon argued for a majority vote only for votes against the wg member’s vote (which is irrelevant in the current draft where the order was been changed and wg members vote after VitaCore).
You’re mentioning the Dispute Resolution Process and that any VitaCore member can trigger that through a challenge in step 2. This should ensure that we would ever only get to step 3 if there are no significant and substantial doubts about the candidate. There may still be less significant reasons that someone would vote against a nominee - should this lead to a cancellation of the nomination? The whole point of step 2 is to filter out legitimate and substantial reasons from onboarding a new steward and distinguish them from other concerns that should not stop a nomination.
With the Dispute Resolution Process in place in step 2, shouldn’t step 3 therefore come with a majority vote?
The Dispute Resolution Process has just been published as VDP-44:
This means that this proposal, VDP-36, may move on to phase 3 on Snapshot anytime from in seven days when VDP-44 has completed its seven-day phase 2 period without significant changes.
Last call for feedback: If anyone feels strongly about any further changes to this proposal, VDP-44, please voice your suggestion here as soon as possible so that we can move forward in a timely manner.
I suggest replacing working group members with VitaCORE in the following options
Option A In a vote necessarily recurring every six months, members of all working groups vote on whether the steward should remain in place in an anonymous poll on Discord or Discourse. If a majority of members of all working groups do not confirm the steward, the steward is offboarded. Option B In a vote optionally occurring at any time, members of all working groups vote on whether the steward should remain in place in an anonymous poll on Discord or Discourse. If a majority of members of all working groups do not confirm the steward, the steward is offboarded.
FYI, there’s now a counter proposal to this proposal: VDP-52 stewards election proposal options
Cross-posting my comment from VDP-51 Stewardship election [counter proposal] - #15 by theobtl here for reference. I’d suggest to update this proposal accordingly:
- If the nomination receives support from a majority of VitaCore members, the nomination is shared publicly in the Discord channel #cross-wg-chat where members of all working groups vote on the nomination.
- If a majority of votes is in agreement, the nominated steward is offered the position.
- If the nomination receives support from a majority of VitaCore members, the nomination is shared publicly in the Discord channel #cross-wg-chat where members of all working groups participate in the voting process on the nomination.
– Anyone who has the corresponding working group’s “Member” Discord role has five votes.
– Anyone who has the corresponding working group’s “Guest” Discord role has a single vote.
– Anyone who has a “Member” or Guest" Discord role in any working group, but not in the corresponding working group, does not have a vote but has the right to receive a public response to questions and suggestions.
- If a majority of votes is in agreement, the nominated steward is offered the position.
If there’s no objection until next week, I’ll update the proposal with this change.