This conversation has gotten quite involved. The main points at issue are:
- Who can nominate a steward
- Dispute Resolution (covered by another proposal, but discussed heavily here)
- How do challenges work
- Majority Rule vs Consensus Building
First, and this is key, this proposal is contingent on the dispute resolution being in place and understood, so I would suggest this vote not occur until the dispute resolution is finalized, since the content of this proposal wouldn’t make sense without the dispute resolution in place.
Who Can Nominate a Steward
The subjective criteria of “significant overlap” is undefined and unsuitable as a criteria for a stewardship nomination. I suggest we make this more concrete so we don’t end up with another path for significant disagreement. This is the way I would suggest we word it: “Any single steward, or any three working group members can nominate anyone as a new steward who fulfils and agrees to the requirements listed below.” We need to keep this criteria simple and not itself subject to dispute.
Dispute Resolution
Covered already and further comment in the Governance Amendment. The key item to address here is the challenge mechanic IS an appeal to dispute resolution, and so the VitaCore member who challenges a steward is considered the creator of the dispute and should bear the cost of that dispute resolution - but in this case, as it is a privilege of VitaCore to challenge the nomination of a steward, the cost of the challenge stays with the challenger (cannot be transferred to the person nominated).
How Do Challenges Work
This is a particularly important part of the proposal, with passing attention in the discussions. This is a privilege VitaCore has, and as such it should be handled with care. Challenges should be considered high damage by the people in VitaCore, and should cost a stake of 5% of the challenger’s VITA (as known from distributions and sales registered with the DAO - not self reported). If the dispute resolution resolves amicably and without judgement by arbitration, the stake is returned. If the challenge ends up arbitrated, then the arbitrator(s) decide the disposition of that stake based on the facts in the case - and this can result in forfeit if the challenge was found to be improper. Challenges must not be free to VitaCore members as challenges represent a significant governance privilege. The challenge must be in writing, costly, and at a minimum reported immediately to both the challenged nominee and to the DAO. The written challenge must be provided to the nominee, and must include the reason for the challenge. The dispute resolution should remain private by default, unless challenged party desires the challenge to become public. With both the cost and potentially public nature of a challenge, we can be sure the challenges we receive are worth the cost to the DAO.
Majority Rule vs Consensus Building
In this I agree with @theobtl and @longevion - we should always strive for consensus building. A lack of consensus should not result in some arbitrary need to accomplish super majorities though. While there is a risk of the minority being overrun, with consensus building prior to votes, this should be much less of a risk. Also, the proposed governance doesn’t include a VitaCore vote at all until after the working group members get to vote. What this means is that any situation where VitaCore votes against the working group members will be high damage. I propose that we order this a little differently:
- Any three working group members or any steward nominates
- VitaCore gets a week to Challenge
- If challenged, challenge announced and dispute resolution starts
- If no challenge happened or the dispute resolution resolves with nominee still in place, submit to working group member vote
- VitaCore confirms vote, but to disagree with working group member result requires a majority of VitaCore to agree with going against the DAO’s vote
- If the votes were successful, and steward accepts, then the steward onboards.