In general, I’m not entirely convinced that the problems this proposal sets out to solve will actually be solved through another proposal and more rules.
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The fact that most proposals come from core contributors is typical in many DAOs and can be influenced, but probably not through a rule but through more communication, documentation and onboarding efforts.
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The fact that the revision process is slow is true, but also typical to DAOs, I believe. We need to realise that lots of VitaDAO community members are here in their free-time, for a few minutes after a long day in the lab or for a bit during their well-deserved weekend. Again, I don’t think rules would solve this attention problem, but delegated voting might which is coming up.
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The fact that proposals don’t always come with a counter-proposal is also an industry practice. VDP-52 stewards election proposal options (in response to VDP-36 and -51) tried to establish that practice, but tbh, I don’t think it added much value but quite a bit of confusion. Most DAOs discuss a proposal in the comments and try to resolve them there; in case of doubt, the proposal is voted on on-chain and token-holders vote for or against. VitaDAO voted proposals down before, so the process works. As a general rule of thumb, I’d rather encourage us to adopt best practice from larger protocol DAOs instead of experimenting with uncommon governance practices ourselves.
I think VitaDAO is at a point where its governance has been in the making for almost two years. At this point, we’re merely improving details of a governance framework that is already quite extensive. VitaDAO is a pioneer in DeSci and Longevity Science, VitaDAO does not also need to pioneer governance innovation at the same time, that would not be resource-efficient. If we feel strongly about that, we could probably team up with bio.xyz and fund experimental DeSci governance research in collaboration with them. cc @vincent